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MANAGING THE CAPITAL ACCOUNT
Sebastián Edwards
University of California at Los Angeles
Globalization has been under attack over the last few years. Activists,
famous academics, and commentators of various stripes have mounted a
systematic campaign against free trade in goods and, especially, in
financial claims.1 One of the latest manifestations of this antiliberalization
mood was the failure of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Cancún
meeting in September 2003. The antiglobalization lobby has focused on a
number of issues, including the effects of freer trade on income
distribution and social conditions and the alleged negative effects of capital
mobility on macroeconomic stability. For example, in his critique of the
U.S. Treasury and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Stiglitz (2002)
argues that pressuring emerging and transition countries to relax controls
on capital mobility in the 1990s was highly irresponsible. Stiglitz goes so
far as to argue that the easing of controls on capital mobility was at the
center of most (if not all) of the recent currency crises in emerging
markets—Mexico 1994, East Asia 1997, Russia 1998, Brazil 1999, Turkey
2000, and Argentina 2001. These days, even the IMF seems to criticize
free capital mobility and to support capital controls (at least to some
degree). Indeed, in a visit to Malaysia in September 2003 Horst Koehler,
then the Fund’s Managing Director, praised the policies of Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohamad, in particular the country’s use of capital controls
in the aftermath of the 1997 currency crises.2
The debate on capital account convertibility and capital account
management has been strongly influenced by specific country
experiences. In particular, Chile’s experience with controls on capital
inflows in the 1990s has attracted considerable attention from policy
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analysts and academics and has been the subject of numerous studies.3
Also, Malaysia’s imposition of controls on capital outflows in the
aftermath of the Asian debt crisis has generated extensive debates on
the benefits of imposing capital controls as a way of managing financial
and currency crises (Dornbusch, 2002; Kaplan and Rodrik, 2002).
These debates on the pros and cons of capital controls have taken
place at the same time that most countries in the world have effectively
moved toward a greater degree of capital mobility. Table 1 presents
data on a new index on capital account restrictions for six regions in
the world for the period 1970–2000. This index is constructed by
combining data from Quinn (2003) and Mody and Murshid (2002), with
country-specific information; it ranges from 1 to 100, with higher
numbers denoting a greater degree of capital mobility. As may be seen
in the table, every region in the world experienced an increase in the
degree of capital mobility during the period under study. The industrial
countries experienced the greatest progress toward capital account
liberalization, while the countries in the Middle East and Northern
Africa moved at the slowest pace.
Table 1. The Evolution of Capital Account Openness, 1970–2000a
1970–89 1990–2000
Group of Mean Median Standard Mean Median Standard
countries deviation deviation
Industrial 66.5 75 21.7 88.8 100 15.2
Latin America 49.2 50 22.5 65.4 75 22.0
and the Caribbean
Asia 41.3 37.5 25.8 53.2 50 24.0
Africa 41.3 37.5 18.4 49.1 50 19.0
Middle East and 62.3 75 25.0 66.3 75 23.4
North Africa
Eastern Europe — — — 60.0 50 17.2
Source: Author’s construction, using the methodology described in the text.
a. The capital account openness index ranges from zero to one hundred, with higher values indicating a greater
degree of openness.
This paper analyzes the emerging and transition economies’
experience with capital account convertibility, capital account
management, and capital controls. The approach I take in this paper
recognizes directly that controlling capital mobility is likely to have
3. See, for example, De Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdés (2000).
289-326 A IMPRIMIR.pmd 02/03/2006, 10:52 290291 Managing The Capital Account
costs and benefits. Most of the potential costs are related to possible
increases in corruption and to microeconomic inefficiencies.4 Benefits,
on the other hand, are potentially related to reducing the country’s
vulnerability to external crises and helping the authorities achieve
specific macroeconomic objectives, including monetary policy and
exchange rate objectives. In discussing theses issues, I focus on controls
on both capital inflows and capital outflows, and I briefly discuss the
important issue of the sequencing of reforms and the timing of
liberalization of the capital account of the balance of payments. The
core of the paper comprises an empirical analysis of the relation
between capital account restrictions and vulnerability to crises. I use
a new cross-country data set to analyze two specific issues: whether
capital controls reduce the probability of a major external crisis and
whether restrictions on capital mobility reduce the negative
consequences of external crises.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 deals with the main
issues raised in recent policy controversies on capital account
management. I focus on the policy objectives in countries that restrict
capital mobility, and I discuss the type of policy interventions, or controls,
proposed to deal with these objectives. Section 2 evaluates the evidence
on the effectiveness of restricting capital mobility. I divide the discussion
into three parts: restrictions on capital inflows, restrictions on capital
outflows, and the appropriate sequencing of economic liberalization.
Section 3 reports some new results on the relation between capital
account restrictions and external crises. This analysis focuses on current
account reversals and addresses whether restrictions on capital mobility
reduce the probability of reversals. I also investigate whether capital
controls reduce the costs of these reversals, once they have occurred.
Finally, Section 4 provides some concluding remarks.
1. MANAGING THE CAPITAL ACCOUNT AND RESTRICTING
CAPITAL MOBILITY: BASIC POLICY OBJECTIVES
Most well-trained economists would agree that there are trade-offs
associated with the imposition of capital controls. On the one hand, not
allowing free trade in financial claims has potential efficiency
4. On the costs associated with capital controls, see the discussions and
empirical analyses in Forbes (2003), Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004), and Gallego
and Hernández (2003).
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consequences, including the misallocation of resources, a decline in
investment, and an increase in corruption.5 On the other hand,
restricting capital mobility could have some potential benefits in the
emerging and transition countries, such as the possible reduction in
vulnerability to crises and increased freedom for the authorities to pursue
domestic policy objectives. Whether the costs offset the benefits is a
complex empirical question, whose answer will depend on the
specificities of each particular country. Cross-country studies that relate
aggregate economic performance, such as average GDP growth, to the
presence of capital controls (and other variables) are an attempt to deal
with this issue in a reduced-form fashion (see Eichengreen, 2001, for a
review of this type of study).
In this section, I discuss the policy objectives of capital controls and
explore policymakers’ goals in restricting capital mobility. Although I
do not deal with the costs of capital account restrictions, the analysis
presented here puts the issues into perspective and organizes the
discussion on managing the capital account.6
Proponents of capital account restrictions in emerging and transition
economies argue that limiting capital mobility will allow the emerging
and transition economies to achieve several policy goals. Generally
speaking, modern discussions on the subject emphasize the following
four policy objectives: reducing vulnerability to external shocks and
potential financial crises; avoiding real exchange rate appreciation;
increasing the degree of monetary independence; and reducing the costs
of currency crises. I discuss each in turn.
—Reducing vulnerability to external shocks and potential financial
crises. Most authors argue that this objective would be best achieved
by limiting short-term—or speculative—capital movements. This is
generally an argument for the imposition of restrictions on capital
inflows, in particular, those that are short term. The idea behind this
proposition is very simple. It is based on the notion that if capital does
not flow in to begin with, it will not flow out during times of
macroeconomic tension—and if capital does not flow out (in other words,
if there is no “capital flight”), then a currency crisis is very unlikely.7
Many authors that support this view argue that, because of moral
5. See Rogoff (1999).
6. See, however, Forbes (2004), Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004), and Gallego
and Hernández (2003) for good discussions on the costs of these policies.
7. Controls on inflows are supported by a number of prominent economists,
including Stiglitz, Portes, Krugman, and Eichengreen.
289-326 A IMPRIMIR.pmd 02/03/2006, 10:52 292293 Managing The Capital Account
hazard and other market imperfections, domestic firms and banks
will overborrow from abroad in the absence of capital control
(McKinnon and Pill, 1999). Supporters of this policy almost invariably
refer to Chile’s experience with controls on capital inflows to illustrate
the merits of this system. Stiglitz, the ardent critic of globalization,
has said, “You want to look for policies that discourage hot money but
facilitate the flow of long-term loans, and there is evidence that the
Chilean approach, or some version of it, does this.”8 Ito and Portes
(1998) and Eichengreen (1999), among others, endorse this view. Some
supporters of this view go beyond the case of Chile, arguing that the
recent experiences of China and India provide evidence that limiting
capital mobility (to inflows and outflows) reduces the likelihood of
external financial crises (Stiglitz, 2002).
—Avoiding real exchange rate appreciation. A common problem
during a market-oriented reform process is that the country
undertaking the reforms tends to be flooded with capital inflows.
This generates forces toward real exchange rate appreciation and
thus reduces the country’s degree of international competitiveness.
Calvo and others (1993) document this phenomenon in great detail
for the case of the Latin American nations. If, as many authors
argue, capital inflows overshoot their long-run (sustainable) level in
the short term, the real appreciation will be destabilizing and will
have to be reversed at some time in the future. Furthermore, in
countries with fixed (or predetermined) nominal exchange rates, this
reversal will require a reduction in domestic nominal prices and is
likely to generate a recession. Discussions on the relation between
capital controls and monetary policy also emphasize the costs of
sterilizing large capital inflows in emerging and transition economies.
It is precisely for this reason that some authors—including those
that deal with the “sequencing of liberalization”—argue that capital
controls, and in particular controls on inflows, will help avoid real
exchange rate appreciation during the transition. (For more
information on the on the sequencing of reform, see section 2.3 of
this paper.)
—Increasing the degree of monetary independence. One of the alleged
virtues of capital controls is that, in the presence of a pegged exchange
rate, they give the country in question greater control over its monetary
policy. That is, in the presence of controls, the local monetary authorities
8. The New York Times, 1 February 1998.
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will have the ability to affect domestic short-term interest rates. In
fact, this increased control over monetary policy is one of the reasons
given in support of the imposition of this type of control in the Asian
nations (Summers, 2000).9 This idea is associated with the so-called
impossibility of the Holy Trinity: it is not possible to simultaneously
have free capital mobility, a pegged exchange rate, and an independent
monetary policy.
Some authors argue that the most efficient way to deal with this
problem is for emerging and transition countries to adopt a flexible
exchange rate (Fischer, 2003). This view became particularly popular
in the aftermath of the currency crises of the 1990s, when the economic
profession adopted the “two-corner” view of exchange rates regimes.
More recently, however, there has been a revival of interest in
intermediate exchange regimes and, thus, in using some form of
restrictions on capital movements to allow for greater monetary
independence. This “monetary independence” argument calls for
policies that decouple domestic and international interest rates. That
is, to achieve this policy objective, countries may, in principle, impose
controls on inflows or on outflows. The challenge, of course, is to select
the policy that allows for the greatest monetary independence at the
lowest cost in terms of distortions. Economists increasingly argue
that the objective of monetary independence is best achieved by
implementing some form of restriction on capital inflows, or at least
on short-term ones.
—Reducing the costs of currency crises. Some authors, including
Krugman (1999) and Kaplan and Rodrik (2002) argue that temporary
controls on capital outflows would allow countries that have suffered
a currency crisis to lower interest rates and establish progrowth
policies.10 According to this view, controlling capital outflows would
also give crisis countries additional time to restructure their financial
sector in an orderly fashion. Controls are to be dismantled once the
economy is back on its feet. As should be clear, this is an argument
for controlling capital outflows in the aftermath of a currency crisis.
This same argument calls for tightening controls in the case of
countries that already had some sort of control before the crisis.
9. This is an old proposition dating back at least to the writings of Robert
Mundell in the early 1960s. Recently, however, it has acquired renewed force as a
result of the exchange rate policy debates.
10. See also Stiglitz (2002).
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This will allow the country to take a “time out” during a difficult
period and gain time to put things in order. Much of the recent
discussion on this particular objective of capital controls is based on
alternative interpretations of the Malaysian experience in the
aftermath of the 1997 Asian crisis. A related argument says that
countries that are suffering crisis symptoms, and appear to be heading
toward a currency collapse, should impose temporary controls on
outflows as a way to avoid the crisis. The controls on outflows should
be relaxed once the crisis has been avoided and macroeconomic
conditions “normalized.”11
Historically, capital controls have also played an important role in
policies aimed at intervening heavily in the domestic capital market.
Until the late 1980s and early 1990s, restrictions on capital mobility
were an integral component of financial policies that subsidized domestic
interest rates and directly allocated credit to favored sectors. These
policies, which were often referred to as “financial repression,” relied
on nonmarket instruments and strived at maintaining low interest
rates as a way of lowering the costs of capital. Under these
circumstances, domestic interest rates tended to be lower than
international interest rates. The country in question would thus
experience severe capital flight in the absence of capital controls on
outflows. In recent years, however, these “financial repression” policies
have largely been abandoned.
Table 2 provides a summary of the policy objectives that the modern
literature on macroeconomic management associates with capital
controls. The table includes a brief description of the mechanisms that
are supposed to help achieve these objectives, information on whether
the specific policy objective calls for controls on inflows, control on
outflows, or both, and some general comments.
Whether capital controls have indeed been effective in helping
achieve the policy objectives in table 2 is, ultimately, an empirical
question. In the rest of this paper, I review the existing country evidence
(section 2), and I discuss new results pertaining to the relation between
capital account restrictions, crisis vulnerability, and the costs of
external crises (section 3).
11. This policy objective may be combined with any (or all) of the previous
three policy goals. For instance, a country may apply controls on inflows in order
to increase its monetary independence. If it faces a speculative attack, it may
temporarily tighten its controls on outflows.
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2. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE CAPITAL CONTROLS?
This section discusses the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of
capital controls. I have divided the discussion in three parts: controls
on inflows; the evidence on controls on outflows; and transitional issues
and the sequencing of economic liberalization. In each of these
subsections, I refer to the controls’ policy objectives discussed above.
2.1 Controls on Inflows
As pointed out above, supporters of restricting capital mobility
through controls on inflows have frequently referred to Chile’s experience
with this policy as an example of what should be done. This section
analyzes two episodes in Chile’s recent history when capital controls on
inflows were imposed. The first episode took place in the late 1970s and
early 1980s, while the second took place in 1991–99. The main conclusion
from this analysis is that the positive effects of Chile’s controls on capital
inflows have been somewhat (but not completely) exaggerated. Because
of this adulteration of the historical record, Chile has become part of
the folklore, and it is one of the most important exhibits in the activists’
case against capital mobility. The rest of the subsection is divided into
two parts, based on Chile’s experience with controls on inflows in the
1970s and the 1990s.12
Chile’s early experience with capital controls
In 1977, three years after initiating a major market-oriented
reform effort, Chile began to receive increasingly large volumes of
foreign capital in the form of syndicated bank loans.13 The vast
majority of these funds was intermediated by local banks, which
provided foreign-currency-denominated loans to final users. The
authorities feared that these inflows would pressure the real exchange
rate toward appreciation and thus have a negative effect on export
performance. Mostly for this reason, starting in 1977 the authorities
implemented a novel system for slowing down the flow of capital into
the country. This policy was based on unremunerated reserve
12. Chile is not the only country that has relied on this mechanism. Colombia
in the 1990s is another notable example. See Cárdenas and Barrera (1997) and
Edwards (2000a).
13. On Chile’s market-oriented reforms, see, for example, Edwards and
Cox-Edwards (1991).
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requirements imposed on short- and medium-term capital inflows. Under
these regulations, loans with maturities below twenty-four months were
forbidden, and those with maturities from twenty-four to sixty-six months
were subject to non-interest-yielding reserve requirements ranging from
10 percent to 25 percent of the value of the loan.14
Three things stand out from this episode. First, total foreign
indebtedness increased very rapidly despite the existence of these
restrictions, almost tripling between 1978 and 1982. It is important
to note that most of this new debt was private sector debt. In fact,
private (nominal) foreign debt increased by more than twenty-three
times between 1973 and 1981, growing at an average annual rate of
almost 40 percent in real terms. Second, the level of foreign
indebtedness of the private banking system also grew very rapidly.
Third, virtually all of these funds were contracted in maturities
exceeding twenty-four months. That is, given that the unremunerated
reserve requirements were in effect throughout the period, Chile did
not receive short-term (or, as it is some times called, speculative)
capital inflows.
In spite of these strict controls on inflows, Chile continued to receive
very large volumes of foreign funds: in 1980 net inflows exceeded 11
percent of GDP, and in 1981 they were equal to 14 percent of GDP. In
1982, a combination of factors led to a sudden stop of capital inflows
into Chile. In the absence of foreign funds, the authorities were unable
to defend the fixed exchange rate, and the country suffered a massive
currency crisis in June 1982. Within a few months, the peso-dollar
rate, which had been fixed at 39 pesos per dollar, was 120 pesos per
dollar. The period that followed the devaluation crisis was overly
traumatic: in 1982 GDP fell 14 percent, unemployment surpassed 25
percent, and the banking sector suffered a major collapse and had to be
bailed out by the government at a cost that exceeded 25 percent of
GDP. All of this took place in an environment in which short-term
capital inflows had been controlled quite severely.
This historical episode in Chile provides an important element in
the evaluation of the effectiveness of restrictions on capital mobility.
It suggests that restrictions on capital inflows are unlikely to reduce
a country’s degree of vulnerability. This is particularly the case if
bank supervision is lax and antiquated, as was the case in Chile at
the time. Moreover, this episode shows that countries can face
14. For greater detail, see Edwards and Cox-Edwards (1991) and Harberger
(1985).
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extremely severe currency crises even if so-called speculative capital
is restricted. All it takes is that capital flowing into the country—in
this case, longer-term capital—suddenly stops flowing, forcing the
country to put into place a major adjustment program.15
Chile’s experience with controls on capital inflows
in the 1990s
Chile reintroduced restrictions on capital inflows in June 1991.
Initially, all inflows were subject to a 20 percent reserve deposit that
earned no interest. For maturities of less than a year, the deposit
applied for the duration of the inflow, while for longer maturities, the
reserve requirement lasted one year. In July 1992, the rate of the
reserve requirement was raised to 30 percent, and its holding period
was set at one year, regardless of the length of stay of the flow. Its
coverage was extended to trade credit and to loans related to foreign
direct investment. Additional changes were introduced in 1995, when
the reserve requirement coverage was extended to Chilean stocks traded
on the New York Stock Exchange (American Deposit Receipts), and to
“financial” foreign direct investment (FDI). In June 1998, pressure
from the East Asian crisis led the authorities to lower the rate of the
reserve requirement to 10 percent, and in September of that year the
deposit rate was reduced to zero. Throughout this period Chile also
regulated foreign direct investment: FDI was subject to a three-year
minimum stay in the country until 1992, when the minimum stay
was reduced to one year.16
The authorities had three goals in mind when they reintroduced
the control policy in 1991:
—First, to slow down the volume of capital flowing into the country
and to tilt its composition toward longer maturities. Interestingly, when
the controls were put in place in April 1991, there was no explicit talk
about reducing the country’s vulnerability to a speculative attack or
currency crisis.
—Second, to reduce (or at least delay) the real exchange rate
appreciation that stemmed from these inflows.
—Third, to allow the Central Bank to maintain a high differential
between domestic and international interest rates. This was expected
15. On the economics of sudden stops of capital inflows, see, for example,
Calvo (2003).
16 For further detail, see Massad (1998a, 1998b), De Gregorio, Edwards, and
Valdés (2000), and Budnevich and Lefort (1997).
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to support the government’s effort to reduce inflation to the lower
single-digit level. It was further expected that the controls would reduce
the country’s vulnerability to international financial instability (Cowan
and De Gregorio, 1998; Massad, 1998b; Valdés-Prieto and Soto, 1996a;
Edwards, 1999; and De Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdés, 2000).
Chile’s controls were thus expected to help achieve three of the four
policy objectives discussed in the preceding section. In the rest of this
subsection, I discuss the extent to which these goals were accomplished.
Chile’s system of unremunerated reserve requirements is
equivalent to a tax on capital inflows. The rate of the tax depends on
both the length of time the funds stay in the country and the
opportunity cost of these funds. As shown by Valdés-Prieto and Soto
(1996a) and De Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdés (2000), the tax







⎡⎤ λρ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞
τ= ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ −λ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎣⎦
(1)
where r* is an international interest rate that captures the opportunity
cost of the reserve requirement, λ is the proportion of the funds that
has to be deposited at the Central Bank, and ρ is the period (measured
in months) that the deposit will be kept in the Central Bank.
An inspection of equation (1) reveals two characteristics of the
Chilean capital controls scheme of the 1990s. First, the tax rate is
inversely related to the time the funds are in the country. This was
exactly the intent of the policy, as the authorities wanted to discourage
short-term inflows. Notice, however, that the tax is quite high even
for a three-year period. In 1997, for example, the average tax for
three-year-funds was 80 basis points. Second, the tax equivalent may
vary through time, both because the rate of the required deposit may
be altered (as it indeed was) and because the opportunity cost of the
funds (r* in equation (1)) changes through time.
Data on the composition of capital inflows into Chile reveal marked
change following the imposition of the controls in 1991, with short-term
flows (that is, less than a year) declining steeply relative to longer-term
ones (De Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdés, 2000). The fact that this change
in composition happened immediately after the implementation of the policy
provides some support for the view that the policy has indeed affected
the composition of inflows. These data also show that, with the exception
of a brief decline in 1993, the total volume of capital inflows into the
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country continued to increase until 1998 (see Edwards, 1999, for details).
De Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdés (2000) use data obtained from the Central
Bank of Chile to calculate the maturity structure of Chile’s total debt.
According to their results, Chile’s short-term debt as a proportion of total
debt declined from 19 percent in 1990 to less than 5 percent in 1997.
A simple analysis of the raw data, however, tends to understate Chile’s
vulnerability to shocks stemming from international financial instability.
Under standard practice, data flows have been classified as “short term”
or “long term” on the basis of contracted maturity. Thus flows that are
contracted for a year or less are classified as short term, while those with
a contracted maturity in excess of 365 days are registered as long term.
It is possible to argue, however, that when measuring a country’s degree
of vulnerability to financial turmoil, what really matters is “residual”
maturity, measured by the value of the county’s foreign liabilities that
mature within a year. The Bank for International Settlements provides
data on residual maturity for loans extended by G10 banks to a group of
selected of Latin American and East Asian countries. An analysis of
those data provides important insights. First, the percentage of short-
term debt does not look as low when data on residual maturity are used
as when contracting maturities are considered. Second, the Bank for
International Settlements data indicate that Chile’s short-term residual
debt was not significantly lower in the mid-1990s than that of Argentina
(a country with no capital restrictions) and it was higher than that of
Mexico (another Latin American country without controls): in mid-1996,
short-term residual debt was 53 percent of total debt in Argentina, 58
percent in Chile, and 49 percent in Mexico.
A number of authors use regression analysis to investigate the
determinants of capital flows in Chile. Soto (1997) and De Gregorio,
Edwards, and Valdés (2000), for example, use vector autoregression
analysis on monthly data to analyze the effects of changes in the
inflows’ tax equivalent. Their results indicate that the tax on capital
movements discouraged short-term inflows. These analyses suggest,
however, that the reduction in short-term flows was fully compensated
by increases in longer-term capital inflows and, consequently, that
aggregate capital moving into Chile was not altered by this policy.
Moreover, Valdés-Prieto and Soto (1998) argue that the controls only
became effective in discouraging short-term flows after 1995, when
its actual rate increased significantly. According to these authors,
however, the aggregate volume of flows was not affected by the controls.
A traditional shortcoming of capital controls (on either outflows or
inflows) is that it is relatively easy for investors to avoid them. Valdés-
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Prieto and Soto (1998), for example, argue that Chile’s controls have
been subject to considerable evasion despite the authorities’ efforts to
close loopholes. Cowan and De Gregorio (1998) acknowledge this fact
and construct a subjective index of the “power” of the controls. This
index takes a value of one if there is no (or very little) evasion and a
value of zero if there is complete evasion. According to their paper, this
index reached its lowest value in the second quarter of 1995; by late
1997 and early 1998, this index had reached a value of 0.8.
Empirical results by Edwards (2000a, 2000b) and Edwards and
Susmel (2003) show that during the second half of the 1990s—more
specifically, during the East Asian and Russian crises—the existence
of controls on inflows did not isolate Chile from external shocks. Indeed,
these studies indicate that at that particular time, Chile was subject
to greater “contagion” from the crisis countries—both “volatility
contagion” and more traditional “mean contagion”—than other Latin
American countries such as Argentina or Mexico, neither of which
had controls on inflows.
Existing evidence also suggests that Chile’s capital controls in the
1990s were not very successful in helping achieve the authorities’ two
other objectives: avoiding real exchange rate overvaluation and
increasing monetary independence. As pointed out earlier, one of the
fundamental purposes of Chile’s restrictions on capital inflows was to
reduce their volume and, therefore, their pressure on the real exchange
rate. According to a paper coauthored by a senior official in the Ministry
of Finance, “Growing concerns [about]… the real exchange rate pressure
of capital inflows… led policymakers to introduce specific capital controls”
(Cowan and De Gregorio, 1998, p. 3).
Valdés-Prieto and Soto (1996b) argue that the imposition of these
restrictions in mid-1991 reflected the authorities’ attempt to balance
two policy objectives: reducing inflation and maintaining a competitive
real exchange rate. According to these authors, by implementing these
unremunerated reserve requirements, the authorities hoped to
reduce—or at least delay—the real exchange rate appreciation effects
of these flows, while also maintaining domestic interest rates that
were significantly higher than international interest rates (corrected
by expected devaluation). Higher domestic interest rates, in turn, were
expected to help achieve the anti-inflationary objective.
The results from a number of empirical studies on the subject show
that the imposition of capital controls was not successful in avoiding
real exchange rate appreciation. Valdés-Prieto and Soto (1996a, 1996b),
Cowan and De Gregorio (1998), Edwards (1999), and De Gregorio,
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Edwards, and Valdés (2000) all arrive at this conclusion using a variety
of statistical and econometric techniques. For instance, Valdés-Prieto
and Soto (1996b) conclude that “the unremunerated reserve requirement
does not affect in any way the long-run level of the real exchange rate…
In addition, … these reserve requirements have an insignificant effect
on the real exchange rate in the short run” (p. 99). Intuitively, the
reason for this result is simple: to the extent that the capital controls
only affect the composition of flows, the effect of the aggregate flows on
expenditure—and thus on the real exchange rate—will be approximately
the same with or without controls.
Another fundamental objective of the capital controls policy
implemented in Chile between 1991 and 1998 was to allow the country
to maintain high domestic interest rates, in a context of a predetermined
nominal exchange rate policy.17 According to Cowan and De Gregorio
(1998, p. 16), an important purpose of the controls policy was to “allow
policymakers to rely on the domestic interest rate as the main
instrument for reducing inflation.” The authors go on to claim that
“the reserve requirement has permitted maintaining the domestic
interest rate above the international interest rate, without imposing
excessive pressure on the exchange rate” (p. 16).
A number of authors use detailed econometric analyses to analyze
whether the presence of controls allowed Chile’s Central Bank to
exercise a greater degree of control over domestic interest rates. De
Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdés (2000), use vector autoregression (VAR)
analysis to conclude that after the controls were imposed, the Central
Bank had a greater ability to alter short-term interest rates in the
very short run. Edwards (1998c) uses a state-space regression analysis
to investigate whether the speed of convergence of domestic interest
rates toward (properly adjusted) international rates had changed after
the controls were imposed. The paper concludes that the restrictions
on capital inflows imposed in 1991 did not have a significant effect on
the level or dynamic behavior of either short- or long-term interest
rates in Chile. These results suggest that, contrary to the authorities’
goals, capital controls did not provide increased control over monetary
policy. These findings are consistent with the results reported by Calvo
and Mendoza (1999), who find that the decline in Chile’s inflation in
17. During this period, Chile’s nominal exchange rate regime was characterized
by a crawling nominal exchange rate band. Although this is not a strict fixed
exchange rate regime, in principle it may be subject to the restrictions associated
with the so-called impossibility of the holy trinity.
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1990–98 was largely unrelated to the authorities’ attempts to target
interest rates. According to Calvo and Mendoza’s (1999) VAR analysis,
the main forces behind Chile’s disinflation were the real appreciation
of the peso and (indirectly) a benign external environment, including
positive terms of trade.
To sum up, the evidence discussed in this section, based on a
large number of careful and detailed econometric studies, is mixed
with respect to the effectiveness of Chile’s controls on capital inflows.
The controls of the 1970s and 1980s were unable to preclude a major
crisis, and while the 1990s episode was more successful, it still had a
number of limitations. Although the controls lengthened the maturity
of inflows, they did not spare Chile from major contagion from the
East Asian and Russian crises. Moreover, there is no evidence
suggesting that these controls helped the authorities achieve their
exchange rate and interest rate objectives.
2.2 Controls on Capital Outflows
Supporters of restricting capital mobility, such as Krugman (1999),
Rodrik (1998), and Stiglitz (2002), argue that temporary controls on
capital outflows will allow crises countries to lower interest rates and
apply progrowth policies. According to this view, controlling capital
outflows would also give crisis countries additional time to restructure
their financial sector in an orderly fashion.18 The controls should then
be dismantled once the economy is back on its feet. The historical
evidence, however, does not support the view that countries that tighten
controls on capital outflows emerge from a crisis faster, or on better
footing, than countries that don’t. Two historical studies of over forty
major currency crises in Latin America both find that countries that
tightened controls after a major devaluation did not exhibit a better
performance, in terms of economic growth, employment creation, or
inflation, than those that did not.19
The 1980s debt crisis provides an illustration of the role of controls
on capital outflows. Those Latin American countries that significantly
stepped up controls on capital outflows—Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico,
to mention just the largest—muddled through and experienced a long
and painful decline in growth, high inflation and rampant
18. See Krugman (1999), for example.
19. See Edwards (1989) and Edwards and Santaella (1993) for details on these
crisis episodes.
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unemployment. Moreover, the stricter controls on outflows did not
encourage the restructuring of the domestic economies, nor did they
result in orderly reforms. The opposite happened, in fact. In all of these
countries, politicians experimented with populist policies that ultimately
deepened the crisis. Mexico nationalized the banking sector and
expropriated dollar-denominated deposits. Argentina and Brazil created
new currencies (namely, the austral and the cruzado, both of which
were eventually eliminated, victims of hyperinflation) while at the same
time controlling prices and expanding public expenditure. In Peru,
tighter controls on outflows allowed the García administration to
systematically erode the bases of a healthy and productive economy, as
the country was rapidly consumed by a virtual civil war. In none of
these countries were controls on capital outflows successful in slowing
down capital flight.
Chile and Colombia offer an interesting contrast. Neither of these
countries significantly tightened controls on capital outflows. Instead
they made an effort to restructure their economies and to provide the
right type of incentives for nationals to repatriate capital held abroad.
Chile also implemented a modern bank supervisory system that greatly
reduced domestic financial fragility. Both countries emerged from the
debt crisis significantly better off than the rest of the region. They
were, in fact, the only two large Latin American countries that
experienced positive growth in per capita GDP and real wages during
the so-called lost decade of the 1980s. Not surprisingly, then, in the
mid-1980s Chile and Colombia were the only Latin American countries
with an investment-grade rating from the major rating agencies such
as Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s.
Recent experiences with currency crises also suggest that capital
controls may give a false sense of security, encouraging complacent
and careless behavior on behalf of policymakers and market
participants. The Korean experience in the mid- and late 1990s is a
case in point. Until just before the Korean currency crisis of 1997,
international analysts and local policymakers believed that the
existence of restrictions on capital mobility made Korea largely
immune to a currency crisis—to the extent that, after giving the
Korean banks and the stance of the Central Bank the next to worst
ratings, Goldman Sachs argued, in its Emerging Markets Biweekly,
that these indicators should be excluded from the computation of the
overall vulnerability index because Korea had “a relatively closed
capital account.” Consequently, Goldman Sachs played down the
extent of Korea’s problems throughout most of 1997. Had Goldman
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Sachs (correctly) recognized that capital restrictions cannot truly
protect an economy from financial weaknesses, it would have clearly
anticipated the Korean debacle, as it anticipated the Thai meltdown.
Controls on the free mobility of capital also gave a false sense of
security to Brazilian policymakers in 1997–98. These authorities
repeatedly argued that since short-term capital inflows were
restricted, the Brazilian currency could not suffer the same fate as
the Mexican peso. They were wrong. Once the collapse of the real
became imminent, domestic and foreigner investors rushed to flee
the country. More recently, the 2003 experience of Venezuela clearly
demonstrates that the imposition of exchange and capital controls is
not an effective way of dealing with major macroeconomic
disequilibria. At best they help postpone (somewhat) the day of
reckoning, and at worst they provide a distraction and ultimately
amplify the magnitude of the eventual crisis.
Nobel Laureate Joe Stiglitz has been particularly critical of the
opening of the capital account—to both outflows and inflows. He claims
that the experiences of China and India, two countries that did not
suffer a crisis, and of Malaysia, which did not follow the IMF’s advice
yet recovered quickly, support his views on the costs of opening up the
capital account (Stiglitz, 2002). His argument is not overly persuasive,
however, since there are many reasons why India and China have not
faced a crisis, and attributing this to the presence of capital controls is
overly simplistic, if not plainly wrong.
The case of Malaysia adds a different angle to the discussion. It
recovered quickly after the 1997 crisis—although not as fast as South
Korea—but it is not clear that the recovery was the result of the
imposition of capital controls and the fixing of the exchange rate. Kaplan
and Rodrik (2002) provide a detailed discussion of Malaysia’s unorthodox
reaction to the currency upheaval of 1997–98. The authors note that
the imposition of capital controls by Malaysia in September 1998 was
greeted with great skepticism by most analysts and observers. In
particular, IMF officials and investment bank analysts argued that
these controls—and the accompanying decisions to peg the exchange
rate and lower domestic interest rates—would slow recovery and
significantly reduce foreign direct investment into Malaysia. This latter
(potential) effect of the controls was considered to be particularly
devastating, as Malaysia has traditionally relied heavily on FDI. Kaplan
and Rodrik argue that this general perception is incorrect, and that
evidence based on appropriate econometric techniques suggests that
Malaysia’s unorthodox program yielded very positive results. Dornbusch
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(2002) takes issue with this view, arguing that the good performance of
the Malaysian economy in the post crisis period had little to do with the
controls. In his opinion, a very friendly international environment,
driven primarily by successive cuts in interest rates by the Federal
Reserve, was the main force behind Malaysia’s recovery of 1999–2000.
A full understanding of the Malaysian episode will require additional
research. That said, Malaysia surprised many observers by tightening
controls only temporarily; and once the economy had stabilized, the
controls were lifted, just as Dr. Mahatir had originally announced.
Historically, the temporary use of controls is quite rare. The norm is
closer to what happened in Latin America during the 1980s debt crisis,
when what was supposed to be a temporary tightening of controls became
a long-term feature of the regional economies.
2.3 Capital Account Liberalization and the
Sequencing of Reform
From a policy perspective, a particularly important question involves
the speed and sequencing of liberalization. The key issues are how fast
and at what point in the liberalization process should capital controls
be eliminated and the capital account liberalized. Many critics of the
reform process of the 1990s argue that in the 1990s many emerging
countries liberalized their current account too fast and in the wrong
sequence (Stiglitz, 2002).
The emphasis on speed and sequencing is not new in policy
discussions. It has been addressed over and again since the beginning
of the economics profession. Adam Smith, for example, argued in The
Wealth of Nations that determining the appropriate sequencing was
a difficult issue that involved, primarily, political considerations.20
Smith supported gradualism on the grounds that cold-turkey
liberalization would result in a significant increase in unemployment:
“To open the colony trade all at once... might not only occasion some
transitory inconvenience, but a great permanent loss... [T]he sudden
loss of employment... might alone be felt very sensibly” (vol. 2, chap.
7, part 3, p. 120).
The issues of speed and sequencing were also central in analyses of
how to design a reform strategy for the former communist countries.
In discussing the problems faced by Czechoslovakia during the early
period of its transition, Václav Klaus points out that one of the main
20. See the Cannan edition, book 4, chap. 7, part 3, p. 121.
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problems was deciding on “sequencing as regards domestic institutional
and price measures, on the one hand, and liberalization of foreign trade
and rate of exchange, on the other” (Klaus, 1990, p. 18).
In the early 1980s the World Bank became interested in exploring
issues related to the sequencing and speed of reform. Papers were
commissioned, conferences were organized, and different country
experiences were analyzed. As a result of this work, a consensus of
sorts developed around five key points: trade liberalization should be
gradual and buttressed with substantial foreign aid; an effort should
be made to minimize the unemployment consequences of reform;
countries with very high inflation should deal with fiscal imbalances
very early in the reform process; financial reform requires the creation
of modern supervisory and regulatory agencies; and the capital account
should be liberalized at the very end of the process and only after the
economy has successfully expanded its export sector. Not everyone
agreed with all of these recommendations, but most people did. In
particular, people at the IMF did not object to these general principles.
Frenkel (1983) argues that the capital account should be opened toward
the end of the reform process. It thus seems fair to say that by the late
1980s, the idea of gradualism and a sequencing in which the capital
account came last had become part of the received wisdom.
Mundell (1995) also endorses this general view on sequencing:
“Unfortunately… there are some negative externalities [of an early capital
account liberalization]. One is that the borrowing goes into consumption
rather than into investment, permitting the capital-importing country
to live beyond its means… without any offset in future output with
which to service the loans. Even if the liabilities are entirely in private
hands, the government may feel compelled to transform the unrepayable
debt into sovereign debt rather than allow execution of mortgages or
other collateral” (p. 20).
Mundell thus acknowledges that the probability a government
bailout of private borrowers constitutes a serious externality. Other
analysts, such as Stiglitz (2002), fail to recognize this important point.
Indeed, when criticizing the IMF’s views on trade imbalances, Stiglitz
argues—incorrectly, in my view—that the government should not worry
if the private sector runs large deficits. Specifically, he states that a
large private sector indebtedness to finance questionable investments
“may be a problem for the creditor, but it is not a problem that the
country’s government—or the IMF—needs to worry about” (p. 200).
The received wisdom on the sequencing of capital account
liberalization began to change in the 1990s, and economists at both the
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IMF and the U.S. Treasury began to argue that an early opening of
the capital account was desirable. This view was clearly stated by the
late Manuel Guitián, then a senior official at the IMF, who in 1995
argued in favor of moving quickly towards capital account
convertibility. Guitián’s paper (suggestively titled “Capital Account
Liberalization: Bringing Policy in Line with Reality”) is one of the
first written pieces that documents the IMF’s change in view regarding
sequencing and capital account convertibility. After discussing the
evolution of international financial markets and expressing
reservations about the sequencing recommendation to leave the capital
account for last, Guitián summarizes his perspective as follows: “There
does not seem to be an a priori reason why the two accounts [current
and capital] could not be opened up simultaneously.… [A] strong case
can be made in support of rapid and decisive liberalization in capital
transactions” (Guitián, 1995, p. 85–86).
 Partially as a result of this change in views on sequencing and
capital account convertibility, a number of emerging and transition
countries began to relax their controls on capital mobility in the second
half of the 1990s. They tended to follow different strategies and paths.
While some countries only relaxed bank lending, others only allowed
long-term capital movements, and yet others—such as Chile—used
market-based mechanisms to slow down the rate at which capital
was flowing into the economy. Many countries, however, did not need
any prodding by the IMF or the United States to open their capital
account. Indonesia and Mexico, to mention two important cases, had
a long tradition of free capital mobility, which preceded the events
discussed in the 1990s, and they never had any intention of following
a different policy.
In the aftermath of the crises of the 1990s, a number of authors,
including economists at the multilateral institutions, began to
reinvestigate the sequencing issue. The idea that an early
liberalization may not be beneficial after all again gained some
currency (see Eichengreen, 2003, for example). But agreeing that
sequencing is important is not the same as saying that capital
controls should never be lifted. A difficult and important policy issue
that the critics of globalization do not really tackle is how and when
to remove impediments to capital mobility. A first step in answering
this question is determining the long-term consequences of capital
mobility on economic performance. As Stiglitz acknowledges, this is
a difficult question, and one about which we have limited evidence.
Recent research using improved measures of the degree of openness
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of capital mobility suggests that a freer capital account has a positive
effect on long-run growth in countries that have surpassed a certain
stage in the development process and have strong institutions and
domestic capital markets (see Edwards, 1999; IMF, 2003). The
challenge for the transition and emerging countries is to rapidly
implement the type of requirements—in terms of bank and capital
market supervision—that would allow them to liberalize their capital
accounts successfully.
3. CAPITAL ACCOUNT RESTRICTIONS AND VULNERABILITY
TO CRISES: SOME NEW RESULTS
As pointed out earlier, the main objectives of policies aimed at
restricting capital mobility include reducing a country’s vulnerability
to external crises (Rodrik, 1998) and minimizing the damage once a
crisis has occurred (Stiglitz, 2002). Although these arguments may
seem plausible, efforts to investigate empirically whether this has indeed
been the case have been limited. In this section, I report some new
empirical work that addresses these issues.21 The analysis focuses on
the occurrence of current account reversals, a crisis-related phenomenon
that tends to be very costly in terms of reduced growth. Specifically, I
ask two questions that are directly related to the degree of openness of
the capital account:
—To what extent does financial openness affect the probability of a
country’s being subject to a current account reversal? In other words,
do restrictions on capital mobility reduce the probability of such
occurrences?
—Does financial openness play a role in determining the effect of
current account reversals on economic performance (that is, GDP
growth)?
I also address the related issues of whether the existence of
restrictions on capital mobility reduces the costs of external crises (that
is, current account reversals) and whether the exchange rate regime
affects the intensity with which reversals affect real activity.
I define a current account reversal as a reduction in the current
account deficit of at least 4 percent of GDP in one year. An interesting
question is how current account reversals relate to the sudden stop of
capital inflows. To make a formal comparison, I define a sudden stop
21. This discussion is partially based on Edwards (2004a).
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as an abrupt and major reduction in capital inflows to a country that
has been receiving large volumes of foreign capital. In particular, a
sudden stop occurs when net capital inflows have declined by at least
5 percent of GDP in one year (see Edwards, 2004b, for details).
Using a panel data set encompassing 157 countries, I find that
the 1970–2001 period was characterized by a 5.8 percent incidence
of sudden stops and an 11.8 percent incidence of reversals. Not
surprisingly, these two phenomena are closely related, but the
relation is less than perfect. Historically, many sudden stops were
not related with reversal episodes. This indicates that many
countries facing a sudden stop effectively used their international
reserves to avoid an abrupt current account adjustment. At the
same time, a number of countries went through major current
account reversals without facing a sudden stop in inflows. Most
countries in this group were not receiving large inflows to begin
with, and they had financed their large deficits by drawing down
international reserves (see Edwards, 2004b).
As shown in table 3, for the complete sample (2,228 observations),
46.9 percent of countries subjected to a sudden stop faced a current
account reversal. At the same time, 22.9 percent of those with
reversals also experienced a sudden stop in the same year. The joint
incidence of reversals and sudden stops is highest in Africa, where
approximately 62 percent of sudden stops happened at the same time
as current account reversals, and almost 30 percent of reversals
coincided with sudden stops. For every one of the regions, as well as
for the complete sample, Pearson chi-squared tests for the
independence of distributions have very small p values, indicating
that although there are observed differences between these two
phenomena, the two are statistically related. For the complete sample,
the chi-squared statistic for the null hypothesis of independence of
distributions has a value of 159.8. These results do not change
significantly if I use different definitions of reversals and sudden
stops or different configurations of lags and leads.
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A. All countries
Presence of reversal No sudden stop Sudden stop Total
No reversal (no. episodes) 1892 69 1961
96.5 3.5 100
90.2 53.1 88.0
Reversal (no. episodes) 206 61 267
77.1 22.9 100
9.8 46.9 12.0




Pearson χ2 (1) 159.8
p value 0.0
B. Industrial countries
Presence of reversal No sudden stop Sudden stop Total
No reversal (no. episodes) 539 18 557
96.8 3.2 100
98.2 81.8 97.6
Reversal (no. episodes) 10 4 14
71.4 28.6 100
1.8 18.2 2.5




Pearson χ2 (1) 21.1
p value 0.0
C. Latin America and Caribbean
Presence of reversal No sudden stop Sudden stop Total
No reversal (no. episodes) 578 23 601
96.2 3.8 100
87.2 44.2 84.1
Reversal (no. episodes) 85 29 114
74.6 25.4 100
12.8 55.8 15.9




Pearson χ2 (1) 18.4
p value 0.0
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D. Asia
Presence of reversal No sudden stop Sudden stop Total
No reversal (no. episodes) 294 12 306
96.1 3.9 100
87.5 48.0 84.8
Reversal (no. episodes) 42 13 55
76.4 23.6 100
12.5 52.0 15.2




Pearson χ2 (1) 9.6
p value 0.002
E. Africa
Presence of reversal No sudden stop Sudden stop Total
No reversal (no. episodes) 579 21 600
96.5 3.5 100
85.8 37.5 82.1
Reversal (no. episodes) 96 35 131
73.3 26.7 100
14.2 62.5 17.9




Pearson χ2 (1) 60.6
p value 0.0
F. Middle East
Presence of reversal No sudden stop Sudden stop Total
No reversal (no. episodes) 193 12 205
94.2 5.8 100
87.7 50.0 84.0
Reversal (no. episodes) 27 12 39
69.2 30.8 100
12.3 50.0 16.0




Pearson χ2 (1) 22.4
p value 0.0
Source: Author’s elaboration.
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In a number of models, the costs of foreign shocks (including sudden
stops and current account reversals) are inversely proportional to the
country’s degree of openness. In Mundell-Fleming-type models, the
expenditure-reducing effort, for any given level of expenditure switching,
is inversely proportional to the marginal propensity to import. In these
models, adjustment costs are also inversely proportional to the degree
of financial integration. Countries with a higher degree of financial
openness will require a smaller reduction in aggregate income to
accommodate external shocks than countries with a lower degree of
financial integration (Frenkel and Razin, 1987). Calvo, Izquierdo, and
Mejía (2004) develop a model in which sudden stops result in abrupt
current account reversals and major real exchange rate depreciations.
Depreciations, in turn, are contractionary, with the extent of the
contraction depending inversely on the degree of trade openness of the
economy. The authors argue that sudden stops and current account
reversals will have a greater impact in closed economies, such as
Argentina, than in relatively open ones, such as Chile.
Previous empirical works on the effects of current account reversals
on real economic performance reach different conclusions. Milesi-Ferretti
and Razin (2000), for example, conclude that reversals “are not
systematically associated with a growth slowdown” (p. 303). Edwards
(2002), on the other hand, uses dynamic panel regressions and
concludes that major current account reversals has a negative effect
on investment and on GDP per capita growth, even after controlling
for investment. Neither of these papers, however, analyzes the
interaction between either openness or the exchange rate regime and
the costs of current account reversals.
3.1 An Empirical Model
I use a “treatment effects” model to estimate jointly an equation on
real GDP growth and a probit equation on the probability of a current
account reversal.
gjj j
* =+ + φβ ω x (2)
Δgg g v tj j t j tj tj tj tj tj ,
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*
,,, tj tj tj δ= α + ε w (5)
Equation (2) is a long-run growth equation, in which gj* is long-
run real per capita GDP growth in country j; xj is a vector of covariates
that capture the role of traditional determinants of growth, and wj is
an error term. Equation (3) is a growth dynamics equation, in which
(gj* – gt–1,j) is a partial adjustment term (the growth gap), vt,j is a
terms-of-trade shock, and δt,j is a dummy variable (that is, the
treatment variable) that takes a value of one if country j in period t
experienced a current account reversal, and zero if the country did
not experience a reversal. Thus, δ is the parameter of interest: the
effect of the treatment on the outcome. Finally, (δt,j OPENNESSt,j) is
a variable that interacts δt,j with a measure of openness. Whether the
country experiences a current account reversal is assumed to be the
result of an unobserved latent variable, δt,j*, in equation (4); this
variable, in turn, is assumed to depend on vector wt,j. Some of the
variables in wt,j may be included in xt,j. Exclusionary restrictions are
imposed for identification purposes Finally, β and α are parameter
vectors, and xt,j and et,j are error terms that are assumed to be bivariate






I use a two-step estimation procedure. Equation (2) is estimated
using data for long-term averages and feasible least squares. Fitted
values of long-term growth are used for gj* in equation (3). Equations
(3) and (5) are then estimated jointly. The estimation of equation (3)
includes terms that interact the dummy variable δt,k with two
openness variables—one for trade and one for financial openness.
Trade openness is defined as the ratio of imports plus exports to
GDP. Financial openness is measured using the new index discussed
above, which combines the Quinn (2003) index and the Mody and
Murshid (2002) index on capital mobility. This new index ranges
from 1 to 100, with higher values denoting a higher degree of financial
integration. Thus, countries with stricter capital controls have a
lower value of this index. Since I am interested in understanding
the role of financial openness in the probability of reversals, one of
the variables in wt,j in equation (4) is the index of financial integration
described above.
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In the long-run growth equation (equation (2)), the dependent variable
is real GDP growth per capita. The following covariates were included: the
log of initial GDP per capita; the investment ratio; the coverage of secondary
education; an index of the economy’s degree of openness; the ratio of
government consumption to GDP; and regional dummies. Some
specifications also include an index for the exchange rate regime. Results
from the estimation of equation (2) are not reported due to space constraints.
In growth equation (3), vt,j is the change in the terms of trade,
and dt,j is the current account reversals dummy. As stated, I also
include the current account reversal dummy interacted with the
trade openness variable and with the financial openness index. If
reversals have a negative impact on short-term growth, the coefficient
of the reversals dummy will be significantly negative. If this effect
is inversely proportional to the country’s degree of openness, the
coefficients of the interaction between reversals and openness should
be significantly positive.
In specifying equation (5), I followed the empirical literature on
crises. I included the following covariates (all lagged one period): the
ratio of the current account deficit to GDP; the external debt to GDP;
net international reserves to GDP; the share of short-term external
debt; the relative occurrence of sudden stops in the country’s region;
growth of domestic credit; the log of initial per capita GDP; an index
of financial integration; and country-specific dummies.
3.2 Basic Results
Table 4 summarizes the basic results obtained from the estimation
of a number of treatment models for GDP growth dynamics. The table
contains two panels. The upper panel includes the results from the
growth equation; the lower panel contains the estimates for the
“treatment equation,” or probit equation on the probability of
experiencing a current account reversal. As pointed out above, the
treatment observations correspond to current account reversal
episodes. Table 4 also includes the estimated coefficient of the hazard
lambda, as well as the estimated elements of the variance-covariance
matrix (equation (5) above). The first three equations are for emerging
markets. The last equation (column 4) is for the complete sample of
emerging and industrial countries. I discuss first the results from
the probit equations on the probability of reversals. I then focus on
the results from the dynamics of growth equations.
289-326 A IMPRIMIR.pmd 02/03/2006, 10:52 317Table 4. Current Account Reversals, Openness, and Growtha
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Growth equation
Growth gap 0.843** 0.843** 0.840** 0.834**
(33.1) (33.1) (32.8) (33.1)
Change in terms of trade 0.062** 0.061** 0.061** 0.066**
(8.51) (8.46) (8.45) (8.51)
Reversal –6.025 –5.087 –2.710** –5.722
(5.66) (3.86) (2.32) (6.64)
Reversal*trade openness 0.032** 0.034** 0.023**
(3.66) (3.78) (3.08)
Reversal*financial openness –0.024 –0.014
(1.21) (0.74)
Treatment equation
Current acc. deficit to GDP (–1) 0.114** 0.114** 0.114** 0.122**
(9.82) (9.82) (9.82) (10.78)
External debt to GDP (–1) 0.004** 0.004** 0.004**
(2.30) (2.30) (2.30)
Net int. reserves to GDP (–1) –0.148* –0.148* –0.148* –0.188*
(1.78) (1.76) (1.76) (2.38)
Short-term external debt to external debt (–1) 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.42) (0.42) (0.42)
Incidence of reversals in region 1.522** 1.524** 1.524** 1.556**
(2.50) (2.50) (2.50) (2.70)
Domestic credit growth (–1) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002*
(1.32) (1.32) (1.32) (1.78)
Log initial GDP per capita –1.743** –1.743** –1.743** –0.845**
(7.51) (7.51) (7.51) (3.71)
Financial openness (–1) –0.007 –0.007 –0.007 –0.009**
(1.54) (1.55) (1.55) (2.09)
Hazard l 1.192** 1.232** 1.082** 1.314**
(2.49) (2.57) (2.25) (3.23)
Variance-covariance matrix
ρ 0.284 0.347 0.257 0.346
σ 4.611 4.606 4.208 3.804
Summary statistic
Wald χ2 1,634.1 1,174.2 1,221.9 1,916.9
No. observations 1,176 1,174 1,174 1,561
Source: Author’s calculations.
* Statistically significant at 10 percent.
** Statistically significant at 5 percent.
a. The estimation method is a treatment effects model with two-step estimates. The treatment equation is a probit
equation on the probability of experiencing a current account reversal; treatment observations correspond to
current account reversal episodes. The sample used in the columns one through three is emerging markets; in
column 4, it is for the complete sample of emerging and industrial countries. Variables denoted (–1) are lagged
one period. Country-specific and year dummies are included but not reported. Absolute value of z statistics are
in parentheses.
289-326 A IMPRIMIR.pmd 02/03/2006, 10:52 318319 Managing The Capital Account
The probit estimates are presented in the lower panel of Table 4.
The results are similar across models: most coefficients have the expected
signs and are statistically significant at conventional levels. These
results indicate that the probability of experiencing a reversal is higher
for countries with a large (lagged) current account deficit, a high external
debt ratio, a rapid rate of growth of domestic credit, lower initial GDP,
and a high occurrence of sudden stops in their region. Countries that
have a higher level of net international reserves have a lower probability
of experiencing a reversal. The coefficients of the short-term debt have
the expected sign, but they tend not to be significant. The coefficient of
the financial openness index is negative in all regressions, and it is
significantly negative in column 4 for the complete sample. This provides
some (weak) evidence suggesting that countries with a higher degree of
financial openness have a lower probability of facing a current account
reversal. That is, contrary to what has been argued by critics of
globalization and by supporters of restricting capital mobility, these
results suggest that the presence of capital account restrictions does
not reduce the probability of an external crisis. These results are robust
to the sample used, as well as to the specification of the probit equation.
A possible explanation is that the public finds way to circumvent the
restrictions. Another possibility is that the authorities in countries with
capital controls may become overconfident and tend to implement riskier
macroeconomic policies.
The results from the estimation of the growth dynamics equation
are reported in the top panel. The coefficients of the growth gap and the
terms of trade have the expected signs and are significant. More
importantly, the coefficients of the current account reversal dummy
are always significantly negative, and the coefficient of the term that
interacts trade openness and reversals is always significantly positive.
In columns 2 and 3, the estimated coefficient of the variable that
interacts reversals and financial openness is negative but not significant.
All in all, these results suggest that financial openness has no effect on
the way in which reversals affect growth. That is, in contrast with the
claims of supporters of capital controls, there is no evidence supporting
the view that countries that restrict capital mobility face a lower cost
of crises—or, more specifically, of current account reversals— than
countries that allow for greater capital mobility.
The interaction between the current account reversals dummy and
the trade openness variable is particularly interesting. In all
specifications in the table, the coefficient of this interactive variable is
positive and significant at conventional levels. This means that the
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effects of a current account reversal on short-term growth depend
significantly on the degree of trade openness of the economy. This result
can be illustrated for the case of column 1:22
Growth effects of reversals = –6.025 + 0.032 TRADE_OPENNESS.
The trade openness variable varies significantly across countries.
Its mean is 65 percent, its standard deviation is 35 percent, and its
median is 67.4 percent. The first decile is 28.7 percent, and the ninth
decile is 130.7 percent. For a country with a degree of openness equal
to the mean, the point estimate of the effect of a reversal on GDP growth
(relative to trend) is: –3.945 percent (–6.025 + 0.032 x 65 = –3.945). If
the country’s degree of openness is equal to the first decile, the effect
of a reversal on growth is more negative, –5.11 percent. If the country
is very open to trade (with a degree of openness corresponding to the
ninth decile), the effect of a reversal on growth is much smaller, at
–1.84 percent.
An important question is whether the effects of current account
reversals on growth dynamics depend on the exchange rate regime. To
address this issue, I divided the sample into four alternative de facto
regimes: hard peg; pegged, intermediate, and flexible (see Levy Yeyati
and Sturzenegger, 2003, for the classification). I then compared the
estimates of both the reversals treatment dummy and the term that
interacts reversals and trade openness. The results may be summarized
as follows: the estimated coefficient of reversals (z statistic) for pegged
regimes was –6.573 (–4.43); for flexible rates it was positive and not
significant, at 0.373 (1.09); and the interactive term was 0.041 (3.43)
for pegged and –0.044 (–1.01) for flexible regimes. A chi-squared test
indicates that these differences in coefficients across regimes are
significant. These results support the idea that flexible exchange rates
act as shock absorbers, allowing countries to accommodate external
shocks, including current account reversals.
To sum up, econometric analysis reported in this section suggests
that restricting capital mobility does not reduce the probability of
experiencing a current account reversal. Current account reversals,
in turn, have had a negative effect on real growth that goes beyond
their direct effect on investment. The regression analysis indicates
that the negative effects of current account reversals on growth depend
on the country’s degree of trade openness: more open countries will
22. I am ignoring the other coefficients from this equation. See table 4 for details.
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suffer less—in terms of lower growth relative to trend—than countries
with a lower degree of trade openness. On the other hand, the degree
of financial openness does not appear to be related to the intensity
with which reversals affect real economic performance. The empirical
analysis also suggests that countries with more flexible exchange rate
regimes are better able to accommodate shocks stemming from a
reversal than countries with more rigid exchange rate regimes. In
interpreting the findings reported in this paper, it is important to
keep in mind that measuring financial integration is far from easy
(Quinn, 2003). Further work on the subject should aim at improving
indexes of financial integration and capital account restrictions.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper I have reviewed both the policy arguments used to
justify restricting capital mobility and the extent to which these policy
objectives have been achieved. I evaluated the effectiveness of controls
on inflows and controls on outflows, and I discussed arguments related
to the appropriate sequencing of economic liberalization. A central
aspect of the paper has been the estimation of an empirical model of
current account reversals and economic performance. Overall, the
analysis presented in this paper suggests that policies aiming at capital
controls have been less effective—in terms of helping achieve their
objectives—than their supporters claim. I have argued that the merits
of Chilean-style controls on capital inflows are somewhat exaggerated,
based on evidence that the effectiveness of this tool was limited. Chile
itself abolished the controls more than five years ago, and the
authorities have no intention of reinstating them in the future. I also
argued that historically the experience with controls on outflows has
tended to be negative: they don’t help to reestablish growth, they
encourage black markets and corruption, and they create a false sense
of security. Malaysia in the 1990s is, perhaps, an exception to this
proposition. The views on the evidence are contradictory, and a
definitive evaluation of effectiveness of these controls will have to await
further details. What is clear, however, is that Malaysia presents a
unique set of historical and political circumstances. It is highly unlikely
that its experience—most notably, the lifting of controls after one year—
would be replicated in other countries. The argument that capital
controls should be abolished once other reforms have been undertaken
has merits. In particular, historical and statistical evidence suggests
that implementing a modern bank supervisory system before lifting
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capital controls is crucial. However, the fact that there is an adequate
and preferred sequencing does not mean that controls on capital mobility
should never be lifted.
Finally, as documented by Forbes (2003), Desai, Foley, and Hines
(2004), and Gallego and Hernández (2003), restricting capital mobility
also has important costs. Once these are introduced into the analysis,
the attractiveness of policies that control capital mobility declines. At
the end of the day, however, the final result on the net benefits (or
costs) of this type of policy will be country specific: in some countries
they may play a positive transitional role, while in others they are
likely to have net costs.
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